Array
(
    [fullTitle] => In Defence of the Belief-Plus Model of Faith
    [abstract] => I defend the claim that propositional religious faith that p implies belief that p. While this claim might seem trivial, it has been criticized by Alston, Pojman, Audi, and (more recently) McKaughan and Howard-Snyder. I begin by defending this view (call it the belief-plus model of faith) against four objections. In addition to criticizing the belief-plus model, each of the above philosophers have offered their own alternatives to the belief-plus model. I focus on McKaughan’s (2013) recent accounts of faith: ‘trusting acceptance’ and ‘hopeful affirmation’. I argue, following Howard-Snyder, that hopeful affirmation fails to give sufficient conditions for faith. I then argue that there is no reason to think that the token acceptances in faith as trusting acceptance are not instances of belief.
    [authors] => Array
        (
            [0] => Array
                (
                    [givenName] => Joshua
                    [affiliation] => Indiana University Kokomo
                )

        )

    [keywords] => Array
        (
        )

    [doi] => 10.24204/ejpr.v8i2.65
    [datePublished] => 2016-06-21
    [pdf] => https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/menuscript/index.php/ejpr/article/view/65/version/14/19
)
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In Defence of the Belief-Plus Model of Faith

Joshua
Indiana University Kokomo

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v8i2.65

Abstract

I defend the claim that propositional religious faith that p implies belief that p. While this claim might seem trivial, it has been criticized by Alston, Pojman, Audi, and (more recently) McKaughan and Howard-Snyder. I begin by defending this view (call it the belief-plus model of faith) against four objections. In addition to criticizing the belief-plus model, each of the above philosophers have offered their own alternatives to the belief-plus model. I focus on McKaughan’s (2013) recent accounts of faith: ‘trusting acceptance’ and ‘hopeful affirmation’. I argue, following Howard-Snyder, that hopeful affirmation fails to give sufficient conditions for faith. I then argue that there is no reason to think that the token acceptances in faith as trusting acceptance are not instances of belief.

Keywords:

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