Array
(
    [fullTitle] => Wittgenstein and the 'Factorization Model' of Religious Belief
    [abstract] => In the contemporary literature Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. The underlying motivation for these attributions seems to be the thought that the content of a belief can clearly be separated from the attitude taken towards it. Such a ‘factorization model’ which construes religious beliefs as consisting of two independent ‘factors’ – the belief’s content and the belief-attitude – appears to be behind the idea that one could, for example, have the religious attitude alone (fideism, non-cognitivism) or that religious content will remain broadly unaffected by a fundamental change in attitude (Kusch). In this article I will argue that such a ‘factorization model’ severely distorts Wittgenstein’s conception of religious belief.
    [authors] => Array
        (
            [0] => Array
                (
                    [givenName] => Genia
                    [affiliation] => University of Southampton
                )

        )

    [keywords] => Array
        (
        )

    [doi] => 10.24204/ejpr.v6i1.193
    [datePublished] => 2014-03-21
    [pdf] => https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/menuscript/index.php/ejpr/article/view/193/version/142/161
)
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Wittgenstein and the 'Factorization Model' of Religious Belief

Genia
University of Southampton

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v6i1.193

Abstract

In the contemporary literature Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. The underlying motivation for these attributions seems to be the thought that the content of a belief can clearly be separated from the attitude taken towards it. Such a ‘factorization model’ which construes religious beliefs as consisting of two independent ‘factors’ – the belief’s content and the belief-attitude – appears to be behind the idea that one could, for example, have the religious attitude alone (fideism, non-cognitivism) or that religious content will remain broadly unaffected by a fundamental change in attitude (Kusch). In this article I will argue that such a ‘factorization model’ severely distorts Wittgenstein’s conception of religious belief.

Keywords:

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