Array
(
    [fullTitle] => Seeing People and Knowing You: Perception, Shared Knowledge, and Acknowledgment
    [abstract] => This article takes up the proposal that action and expression enable perceptual knowledge of other minds, a proposal that runs counter to a tradition of thinking that other minds are special in that they are essentially unobservable. I argue that even if we accept this proposal regarding perceptual knowledge, there is still a difference between knowing another person and knowing other things. I articulate this difference by pointing out that I can know another person by sharing knowledge with her. Such sharing is expressed in the use of the second-person pronoun. Thus, I argue, other minds are indeed special as objects of knowledge, but not in the way the tradition has supposed.
    [authors] => Array
        (
            [0] => Array
                (
                    [givenName] => Stina
                    [affiliation] => Åbo Akademi University
                )

        )

    [keywords] => Array
        (
        )

    [doi] => 10.24204/ejpr.v5i4.205
    [datePublished] => 2013-12-22
    [pdf] => https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/menuscript/index.php/ejpr/article/view/205/version/154/173
)
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Seeing People and Knowing You: Perception, Shared Knowledge, and Acknowledgment

Stina
Åbo Akademi University

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v5i4.205

Abstract

This article takes up the proposal that action and expression enable perceptual knowledge of other minds, a proposal that runs counter to a tradition of thinking that other minds are special in that they are essentially unobservable. I argue that even if we accept this proposal regarding perceptual knowledge, there is still a difference between knowing another person and knowing other things. I articulate this difference by pointing out that I can know another person by sharing knowledge with her. Such sharing is expressed in the use of the second-person pronoun. Thus, I argue, other minds are indeed special as objects of knowledge, but not in the way the tradition has supposed.

Keywords:

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