Array
(
    [fullTitle] => Molinism and Theological Compatibilism
    [abstract] => In a series of recent papers John martin Fischer argues that the so- called molinist solution to the problem of reconciling divine omniscience with human freedom does not offer such a solution at all. Instead, he maintains, molina simply presupposes theological compatibilism. However, Fischer construes the problem in terms of sempiternalist omniscience, whereas classical molinism adopts atemporalism. I argue that, moreover, an atemporalist reformulation of Fischer’s argument designed to show that molinism is not even consistent is unsuccessful as well, since it employs a transfer principle about causal inaccessibility that molina rightfully rejects.
    [authors] => Array
        (
            [0] => Array
                (
                    [givenName] => Christoph
                    [affiliation] => University of Innsbruck
                )

        )

    [keywords] => Array
        (
        )

    [doi] => 10.24204/ejpr.v5i1.249
    [datePublished] => 2013-03-21
    [pdf] => https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/menuscript/index.php/ejpr/article/view/249/version/198/221
)
"Loading..."

Molinism and Theological Compatibilism

Christoph
University of Innsbruck

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v5i1.249

Abstract

In a series of recent papers John martin Fischer argues that the so- called molinist solution to the problem of reconciling divine omniscience with human freedom does not offer such a solution at all. Instead, he maintains, molina simply presupposes theological compatibilism. However, Fischer construes the problem in terms of sempiternalist omniscience, whereas classical molinism adopts atemporalism. I argue that, moreover, an atemporalist reformulation of Fischer’s argument designed to show that molinism is not even consistent is unsuccessful as well, since it employs a transfer principle about causal inaccessibility that molina rightfully rejects.

Keywords:

Download PDF