Array
(
    [fullTitle] => Modified Gaunilo-Type Objections Against Modal Ontological Arguments
    [abstract] => Modal ontological arguments are often claimed to be immune to the «perfect island» objection of Gaunilo, because necessary existence does not apply to material, contingent things. But Gaunilo’s strategy can be reformulated: we can speak of non-contingent beings, like quasi-Gods or evil God. The paper is intended to show that we can construct ontological arguments for the existence of such beings, and that those arguments are equally plausible as theistic modal argument. This result does not show that this argument is fallacious, but it shows that it is dialectically ineffective as an argument for theism.
    [authors] => Array
        (
            [0] => Array
                (
                    [givenName] => Daniel
                    [affiliation] => University of Warsaw
                )

        )

    [keywords] => Array
        (
        )

    [doi] => 10.24204/ejpr.v4i2.299
    [datePublished] => 2012-06-21
    [pdf] => https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/menuscript/index.php/ejpr/article/view/299/version/247/274
)
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Modified Gaunilo-Type Objections Against Modal Ontological Arguments

Daniel
University of Warsaw

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v4i2.299

Abstract

Modal ontological arguments are often claimed to be immune to the «perfect island» objection of Gaunilo, because necessary existence does not apply to material, contingent things. But Gaunilo’s strategy can be reformulated: we can speak of non-contingent beings, like quasi-Gods or evil God. The paper is intended to show that we can construct ontological arguments for the existence of such beings, and that those arguments are equally plausible as theistic modal argument. This result does not show that this argument is fallacious, but it shows that it is dialectically ineffective as an argument for theism.

Keywords:

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