Array
(
    [fullTitle] => Euthyphro's "Dilemma", Socrates' Daimonion and Plato's God
    [abstract] => In this paper I start with the familiar accusation that divine command ethics faces a «Euthyphro dilemma». By looking at what Plato’s Euthyphro actually says, I argue that no such argument against divine-command ethics was Plato’s intention, and that, in any case, no such argument is cogent. I then explore the place of divine commands and inspiration in Plato’s thought more generally, arguing that Plato sees an important epistemic and practical role for both.
    [authors] => Array
        (
            [0] => Array
                (
                    [givenName] => Timothy
                    [affiliation] => Open University
                )

        )

    [keywords] => Array
        (
        )

    [doi] => 10.24204/ejpr.v2i1.350
    [datePublished] => 2010-03-21
    [pdf] => https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/menuscript/index.php/ejpr/article/view/350/version/297/324
)
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Euthyphro's "Dilemma", Socrates' Daimonion and Plato's God

Timothy
Open University

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v2i1.350

Abstract

In this paper I start with the familiar accusation that divine command ethics faces a «Euthyphro dilemma». By looking at what Plato’s Euthyphro actually says, I argue that no such argument against divine-command ethics was Plato’s intention, and that, in any case, no such argument is cogent. I then explore the place of divine commands and inspiration in Plato’s thought more generally, arguing that Plato sees an important epistemic and practical role for both.

Keywords:

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