Array
(
    [fullTitle] => Wagering Against Divine Hiddenness
    [abstract] => J.L. Schellenberg argues that divine hiddenness provides an argument for the conclusion that God does not exist, for if God existed he would not allow non-resistant non-belief to occur, but non-resistant non-belief does occur, so God does not exist. In this paper, I argue that the stakes involved in theistic considerations put pressure on Schellenberg’s premise that non-resistant non- belief occurs. First, I specify conditions for someone’s being a non-resistant non-believer. Then, I argue that many people fulfil these conditions because, given some plausible assumptions, there is a very good pragmatic reason to be a theist rather than an atheist. I assume it is more likely that theists go to heaven than atheists, and I argue there is a non-zero probability that one can receive infinite utility and a method of comparing outcomes with infinite utilities in which the probability of each outcome affects the final expected values. Then, I show how this argument entails there is no good reason to think that there are very many non-resistant non-believers.
    [authors] => Array
        (
            [0] => Array
                (
                    [givenName] => Liz
                    [affiliation] => University of Notre Dame
                )

        )

    [keywords] => Array
        (
        )

    [doi] => 10.24204/ejpr.v8i4.1757
    [datePublished] => 2016-12-22
    [pdf] => https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/menuscript/index.php/ejpr/article/view/1757/version/376/1442
)
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Wagering Against Divine Hiddenness

Liz
University of Notre Dame

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v8i4.1757

Abstract

J.L. Schellenberg argues that divine hiddenness provides an argument for the conclusion that God does not exist, for if God existed he would not allow non-resistant non-belief to occur, but non-resistant non-belief does occur, so God does not exist. In this paper, I argue that the stakes involved in theistic considerations put pressure on Schellenberg’s premise that non-resistant non- belief occurs. First, I specify conditions for someone’s being a non-resistant non-believer. Then, I argue that many people fulfil these conditions because, given some plausible assumptions, there is a very good pragmatic reason to be a theist rather than an atheist. I assume it is more likely that theists go to heaven than atheists, and I argue there is a non-zero probability that one can receive infinite utility and a method of comparing outcomes with infinite utilities in which the probability of each outcome affects the final expected values. Then, I show how this argument entails there is no good reason to think that there are very many non-resistant non-believers.

Keywords:

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