Array
(
    [fullTitle] => The Problem of Alternative Monotheisms: Another Serious Challenge to Theism
    [abstract] => 
Theistic and analytic philosophers of religion typically privilege classical theism by ignoring or underestimating the great threat of alternative monotheisms.[1] In this article we discuss numerous god-models, such as those involving weak, stupid, evil, morally indifferent, and non-revelatory gods. We find that theistic philosophers have not successfully eliminated these and other possibilities, or argued for their relative improbability. In fact, based on current evidence – especially concerning the hiddenness of God and the gratuitous evils in the world – many of these hypotheses appear to be more probable than theism. Also considering the – arguably infinite – number of alternative monotheisms, the inescapable conclusion is that theism is a very improbable god-concept, even when it is assumed that one and only one transcendent god exists.

[1] I take ‘theism’ to mean ‘classical theism’, which is but one of many possible monotheisms. Avoiding much of the discussion around classical theism, I wish to focus on the challenges in arguing for theism over monotheistic alternatives. I consider theism and alternative monotheisms as entailing the notion of divine transcendence.

    [authors] => Array
        (
            [0] => Array
                (
                    [givenName] => Raphael
                    [affiliation] => University of Sydney
                )

        )

    [keywords] => Array
        (
            [0] => Theism
            [1] => deism
            [2] => quasi-deism
            [3] => The Evil God Challenge
            [4] => argument from alternative monotheisms
        )

    [doi] => 10.24204/ejpr.v10i1.1801
    [datePublished] => 2018-03-11
    [pdf] => https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/menuscript/index.php/ejpr/article/view/1801/version/398/2040
)
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The Problem of Alternative Monotheisms: Another Serious Challenge to Theism

Raphael
University of Sydney

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v10i1.1801

Abstract

Theistic and analytic philosophers of religion typically privilege classical theism by ignoring or underestimating the great threat of alternative monotheisms.[1] In this article we discuss numerous god-models, such as those involving weak, stupid, evil, morally indifferent, and non-revelatory gods. We find that theistic philosophers have not successfully eliminated these and other possibilities, or argued for their relative improbability. In fact, based on current evidence – especially concerning the hiddenness of God and the gratuitous evils in the world – many of these hypotheses appear to be more probable than theism. Also considering the – arguably infinite – number of alternative monotheisms, the inescapable conclusion is that theism is a very improbable god-concept, even when it is assumed that one and only one transcendent god exists.


[1] I take ‘theism’ to mean ‘classical theism’, which is but one of many possible monotheisms. Avoiding much of the discussion around classical theism, I wish to focus on the challenges in arguing for theism over monotheistic alternatives. I consider theism and alternative monotheisms as entailing the notion of divine transcendence.

Keywords: Theism

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