Array
(
    [fullTitle] => A Cosmological Argument against Physicalism
    [abstract] => In this article, I present a Leibnizian cosmological argument to the conclusion that either the totality of physical beings has a non-physical cause, or a necessary being exists. The crucial premise of the argument is a restricted version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, namely the claim that every contingent physical phenomenon has a sufficient cause (PSR-P). I defend this principle by comparing it with a causal principle that is fundamental for physicalism, namely the Causal Closure of Physics, which says that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause (CC). I find that the evidence for Causal Closure is weaker than the evidence for PSR-P, which means that physicalists who take CC to be justified must concede that PSR-P is also justified, and to a higher degree. Since my Leibnizian cosmological argument succeeds if PSR-P is granted, I conclude that physicalists must either give up CC and thereby physicalism, or accept that a necessary being exists.
    [authors] => Array
        (
            [0] => Array
                (
                    [givenName] => Mats
                    [affiliation] => Umeå University
                )

        )

    [keywords] => Array
        (
            [0] => Cosmological Arguments
            [1] => Physicalism
            [2] => Causal Closure
        )

    [doi] => 10.24204/ejpr.v9i2.1938
    [datePublished] => 2017-06-19
    [pdf] => https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/menuscript/index.php/ejpr/article/view/1938/version/447/1558
)
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A Cosmological Argument against Physicalism

Mats
Umeå University

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v9i2.1938

Abstract

In this article, I present a Leibnizian cosmological argument to the conclusion that either the totality of physical beings has a non-physical cause, or a necessary being exists. The crucial premise of the argument is a restricted version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, namely the claim that every contingent physical phenomenon has a sufficient cause (PSR-P). I defend this principle by comparing it with a causal principle that is fundamental for physicalism, namely the Causal Closure of Physics, which says that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause (CC). I find that the evidence for Causal Closure is weaker than the evidence for PSR-P, which means that physicalists who take CC to be justified must concede that PSR-P is also justified, and to a higher degree. Since my Leibnizian cosmological argument succeeds if PSR-P is granted, I conclude that physicalists must either give up CC and thereby physicalism, or accept that a necessary being exists.

Keywords: Cosmological Arguments

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