Array
(
    [fullTitle] => Does Molinism Reconcile Freedom and Foreknowledge?
    [abstract] => John Martin Fischer has argued that Molinism does not constitute a response to the argument that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. I argue that T. Ryan Byerly’s recent work on the mechanics of foreknowledge sheds light on this issue. It shows that Fischer’s claim is ambiguous, and that it may turn out to be false on at least one reading, but only if the Molinist can explain how God knows true counterfactuals of freedom.
    [authors] => Array
        (
            [0] => Array
                (
                    [givenName] => Justin
                    [affiliation] => University of Massachusetts Amherst
                )

        )

    [keywords] => Array
        (
            [0] => foreknowledge
            [1] => middle knowledge
            [2] => molinism
            [3] => free will
        )

    [doi] => 10.24204/ejpr.v10i2.1983
    [datePublished] => 2018-06-12
    [pdf] => https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/menuscript/index.php/ejpr/article/view/1983/version/465/2099
)
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Does Molinism Reconcile Freedom and Foreknowledge?

Justin
University of Massachusetts Amherst

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v10i2.1983

Abstract

John Martin Fischer has argued that Molinism does not constitute a response to the argument that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. I argue that T. Ryan Byerly’s recent work on the mechanics of foreknowledge sheds light on this issue. It shows that Fischer’s claim is ambiguous, and that it may turn out to be false on at least one reading, but only if the Molinist can explain how God knows true counterfactuals of freedom.

Keywords: foreknowledge

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