Array
(
    [fullTitle] => Value, Transcendence and Analogy
    [abstract] => 
Current naturalistic accounts of value face the problem of explaining the normative constraints that value impose on agents. Attempts to solve this problem have progressively relaxed the strictness of naturalistic requirements, up to the point of seeking theistic solutions. However, appeals to God are also problematic, since it is questionable that a relevant notion of God is conceivable at all: if God is wholly other He cannot matter for our choices and if He is a being among natural beings He cannot explain our normative constraints. Engaging a discussion with Fiona Ellis’ treatment of the problem, this essay sketches an account of transcendence, which vindicates the conceivability of a notion of God suitable for the explanation of value. The proposal rests on the possibility of transcendental arguments based on analogy.

    [authors] => Array
        (
            [0] => Array
                (
                    [givenName] => Gabriele
                    [affiliation] => University of Bamberg, Germany and University of Udine, Italy
                )

        )

    [keywords] => Array
        (
            [0] => Value
            [1] => naturalism
            [2] => supernaturalism
            [3] => transcendence
            [4] => analogy
        )

    [doi] => 10.24204/ejpr.v10i2.1999
    [datePublished] => 2018-06-12
    [pdf] => https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/menuscript/index.php/ejpr/article/view/1999/version/477/2101
)
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Value, Transcendence and Analogy

Gabriele
University of Bamberg, Germany and University of Udine, Italy

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v10i2.1999

Abstract

Current naturalistic accounts of value face the problem of explaining the normative constraints that value impose on agents. Attempts to solve this problem have progressively relaxed the strictness of naturalistic requirements, up to the point of seeking theistic solutions. However, appeals to God are also problematic, since it is questionable that a relevant notion of God is conceivable at all: if God is wholly other He cannot matter for our choices and if He is a being among natural beings He cannot explain our normative constraints. Engaging a discussion with Fiona Ellis’ treatment of the problem, this essay sketches an account of transcendence, which vindicates the conceivability of a notion of God suitable for the explanation of value. The proposal rests on the possibility of transcendental arguments based on analogy.

Keywords: Value

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