Array
(
    [fullTitle] => Epistemology and Wellbeing
    [abstract] => There is a general presumption that epistemology does not have anything to do with wellbeing. In this paper I challenge these assumption, by examining the aftermath of the Gettier examples, the debate between internalism and externalism and the rise of virtue epistemology. In focusing on the epistemic agent as the locus of normativity, virtue epistemology allows one to ask questions about epistemic goods and their relationship to other kinds of good, including the good of the agent. Specifically it is argued that emotion has a positive role to play in epistemology, an example from Aquinas is used to illustrate this and to illustrate the different kinds of good involved in cognition.
    [authors] => Array
        (
            [0] => Array
                (
                    [givenName] => Paul
                    [affiliation] => Trinity College Dublin
                )

        )

    [keywords] => Array
        (
        )

    [doi] => 10.24204/ejpr.v10i1.2527
    [datePublished] => 2018-03-11
    [pdf] => https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/menuscript/index.php/ejpr/article/view/2527/version/509/2044
)
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Epistemology and Wellbeing

Paul
Trinity College Dublin

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v10i1.2527

Abstract

There is a general presumption that epistemology does not have anything to do with wellbeing. In this paper I challenge these assumption, by examining the aftermath of the Gettier examples, the debate between internalism and externalism and the rise of virtue epistemology. In focusing on the epistemic agent as the locus of normativity, virtue epistemology allows one to ask questions about epistemic goods and their relationship to other kinds of good, including the good of the agent. Specifically it is argued that emotion has a positive role to play in epistemology, an example from Aquinas is used to illustrate this and to illustrate the different kinds of good involved in cognition.

Keywords:

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