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    [fullTitle] => How Are We to Think of God's Freedom?
    [abstract] => The paper discusses two conceptions of divine freedom. The first, Hugh McCann’s, proposes that God is a timelessly eternal act, whose agency is not deliberative and who, in that act, creates himself and the contents of his will. God is such an act. Following discussion of this view, its costs and benefits, a more traditional account of God’s freedom, in which he possesses vestigial alternativity, the freedom to choose an alternative should there have been a sufficient reason to do so.
    [authors] => Array
        (
            [0] => Array
                (
                    [givenName] => Paul
                    [affiliation] => University of London
                )

        )

    [keywords] => Array
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    [doi] => 10.24204/ejpr.v7i3.104
    [datePublished] => 2015-09-23
    [pdf] => https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/menuscript/index.php/ejpr/article/view/104/version/53/63
)
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How Are We to Think of God's Freedom?

Paul
University of London

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v7i3.104

Abstract

The paper discusses two conceptions of divine freedom. The first, Hugh McCann’s, proposes that God is a timelessly eternal act, whose agency is not deliberative and who, in that act, creates himself and the contents of his will. God is such an act. Following discussion of this view, its costs and benefits, a more traditional account of God’s freedom, in which he possesses vestigial alternativity, the freedom to choose an alternative should there have been a sufficient reason to do so.

Keywords:

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