Array
(
    [fullTitle] => Agency Incompatibilism and Divine Agency
    [abstract] => In this paper, I consider whether an argument for compatibilism about free will and determinism might be developed from the thought that God’s agency seems consistent with the rational determination of at least some divine actions by the True and the Good. I attempt to develop such an argument and then consider how to respond to it from the point of view of my own position, which I call Agency Incompatibilism. I argue that a crucial premise in the argument is ambiguous and offer responses to the argument on behalf of the Agency Incompatibilist, on each of the two disambiguations.
    [authors] => Array
        (
            [0] => Array
                (
                    [givenName] => Helen
                    [affiliation] => University of Leeds
                )

        )

    [keywords] => Array
        (
        )

    [doi] => 10.24204/ejpr.v7i3.105
    [datePublished] => 2015-09-23
    [pdf] => https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/menuscript/index.php/ejpr/article/view/105/version/54/64
)
"Loading..."

Agency Incompatibilism and Divine Agency

Helen
University of Leeds

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v7i3.105

Abstract

In this paper, I consider whether an argument for compatibilism about free will and determinism might be developed from the thought that God’s agency seems consistent with the rational determination of at least some divine actions by the True and the Good. I attempt to develop such an argument and then consider how to respond to it from the point of view of my own position, which I call Agency Incompatibilism. I argue that a crucial premise in the argument is ambiguous and offer responses to the argument on behalf of the Agency Incompatibilist, on each of the two disambiguations.

Keywords:

Download PDF