Array
(
    [fullTitle] => Perpetual Present: Henri Bergson and Atemporal Duration
    [abstract] => The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that adjusting Stump and Kretzmann’s “atemporal duration” with la durée, a key concept in the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859–1941), can respond to the most significant objections aimed at Stump and Kretzmann’s re-interpretation of Boethian eternity. This paper deals with three of these objections: the incoherence of the notion of “atemporal duration,” the impossibility of this duration being time-like, and the problems involved in conceiving it as being related to temporal duration by a relation of analogy. I conclude that “atemporal duration” (which has unfortunately come to be regarded with suspicion by most analytic philosophers of religion) — when combined with Bergson’s durée to become an “atemporal durée” — is a coherent understanding of divine eternity.
    [authors] => Array
        (
            [0] => Array
                (
                    [givenName] => Matyáš
                    [affiliation] => University of Cambridge
                )

        )

    [keywords] => Array
        (
            [0] => atemporal duration
            [1] => God and time
            [2] => Henri Bergson
            [3] => Stump and Kretzmann
            [4] => Boethius
        )

    [doi] => 10.24204/ejpr.v0i0.2629
    [datePublished] => 2019-09-19
    [pdf] => https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/menuscript/index.php/ejpr/article/view/2629/version/555/2367
)
"Loading..."

Perpetual Present: Henri Bergson and Atemporal Duration

Matyáš
University of Cambridge

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v0i0.2629

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that adjusting Stump and Kretzmann’s “atemporal duration” with la durée, a key concept in the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859–1941), can respond to the most significant objections aimed at Stump and Kretzmann’s re-interpretation of Boethian eternity. This paper deals with three of these objections: the incoherence of the notion of “atemporal duration,” the impossibility of this duration being time-like, and the problems involved in conceiving it as being related to temporal duration by a relation of analogy. I conclude that “atemporal duration” (which has unfortunately come to be regarded with suspicion by most analytic philosophers of religion) — when combined with Bergson’s durée to become an “atemporal durée” — is a coherent understanding of divine eternity.

Keywords: atemporal duration

Download PDF