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    [fullTitle] => The Open Future, Free Will and Divine Assurance: Responding to Three Common Objections to the Open View
    [abstract] => In this essay I respond to three of the most forceful objections to the open view of the future. It is argued that a) open view advocates must deny bivalence; b) the open view offers no theodicy advantages over classical theism; and c) the open view can’t assure believers that God can work all things to the better (Rom. 8:28). I argue that the first objection is premised on an inadequate assessment of future tensed propositions, the second is rooted in an inadequate assessment of free will, and the third is grounded in an inadequate assessment of God’s intelligence.
    [authors] => Array
        (
            [0] => Array
                (
                    [givenName] => Gregory
                    [affiliation] => 
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    [keywords] => Array
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    [doi] => 10.24204/ejpr.v7i3.112
    [datePublished] => 2015-09-23
    [pdf] => https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/menuscript/index.php/ejpr/article/view/112/version/61/71
)
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The Open Future, Free Will and Divine Assurance: Responding to Three Common Objections to the Open View

Gregory

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v7i3.112

Abstract

In this essay I respond to three of the most forceful objections to the open view of the future. It is argued that a) open view advocates must deny bivalence; b) the open view offers no theodicy advantages over classical theism; and c) the open view can’t assure believers that God can work all things to the better (Rom. 8:28). I argue that the first objection is premised on an inadequate assessment of future tensed propositions, the second is rooted in an inadequate assessment of free will, and the third is grounded in an inadequate assessment of God’s intelligence.

Keywords:

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