Array
(
    [fullTitle] => No Hope in the Dark: Problems for four-dimensionalism
    [abstract] => 
Whether or not it is coherent to place hope in a future life beyond the grave has become a central question in the larger debate about whether a materialist view of human persons can accommodate Christian belief.  Hud Hudson defends a four-dimensional account of resurrection in order to avoid persistent difficulties experienced by three-dimensionalist animalism.  I present two difficulties unique to Hudson’s view.  The first problem of counterpart hope is a manifestation of a general weakness of four-dimensional views to accommodate adequately prudential concern about one’s future self.  More significantly, the second problem of quasi hope demonstrates that even if a temporal parts view can accommodate the possibility of future resurrection it necessarily leaves human beings in the dark about their individual futures and thus incapable of hope.  I conclude that whatever its merits in demonstrating the possibility of resurrection, four-dimensionalist materialism cannot accommodate veridical Christian hope.

    [authors] => Array
        (
            [0] => Array
                (
                    [givenName] => Jonathan J
                    [affiliation] => School of Advanced Study, University of London; Margaret Beaufort Institute, Cambridge
                )

        )

    [keywords] => Array
        (
            [0] => Four-dimensionalism
            [1] => Temporal parts
            [2] => Personal Identity
            [3] => Resurrection
            [4] => Metaphysics
            [5] => Materialism
            [6] => Physicalism
            [7] => Philosophy of Mind
            [8] => Philosophy of Religion
            [9] => Hud Hudson
            [10] => David Lewis
            [11] => Hope
            [12] => Analytic Theology
            [13] => van Inwagen
            [14] => Life after death
            [15] => Persistence
            [16] => Survival
        )

    [doi] => 10.24204/ejpr.v11i3.2958
    [datePublished] => 2019-09-19
    [pdf] => https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/menuscript/index.php/ejpr/article/view/2958/version/622/2357
)
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No Hope in the Dark: Problems for four-dimensionalism

Jonathan J
School of Advanced Study, University of London; Margaret Beaufort Institute, Cambridge

DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v11i3.2958

Abstract

Whether or not it is coherent to place hope in a future life beyond the grave has become a central question in the larger debate about whether a materialist view of human persons can accommodate Christian belief.  Hud Hudson defends a four-dimensional account of resurrection in order to avoid persistent difficulties experienced by three-dimensionalist animalism.  I present two difficulties unique to Hudson’s view.  The first problem of counterpart hope is a manifestation of a general weakness of four-dimensional views to accommodate adequately prudential concern about one’s future self.  More significantly, the second problem of quasi hope demonstrates that even if a temporal parts view can accommodate the possibility of future resurrection it necessarily leaves human beings in the dark about their individual futures and thus incapable of hope.  I conclude that whatever its merits in demonstrating the possibility of resurrection, four-dimensionalist materialism cannot accommodate veridical Christian hope.

Keywords: Four-dimensionalism

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