God, Personhood, and Infinity: Against a Hickian Argument
Mohammad Saleh
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v12i1.2987
Abstract
Criticizing Richard Swinburne’s conception of God, John Hick argues that God cannot be personal because infinity and personhood are mutually incompatible. An essential characteristic of a person, Hick claims, is having a boundary which distinguishes that person from other persons. But having a boundary is incompatible with being infinite. Infinite beings are unbounded. Hence God cannot be thought of as an infinite person. In this paper, I argue that the Hickian argument is flawed because boundedness is an equivocal notion: in one sense it is not essential to personhood, and in another sense—which is essential to personhood—it is compatible with being infinite.
Keywords: Personal Conception of God